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EXTENDED WARRANTIES, THE GREAT LIE: 
WHY THE KING HAS NO CLOTHES 
DAVID E. MISSIRIAN* 
Abstract 
This paper examines how states have effectively eviscerated 
consumer protections in consumer product purchases all while under the 
guise of allegedly adding more consumer protection.  The state and 
federal governments have sacrificed the consumer in the name of 
economic profit and economic revival by selling the consumer into 
economic slavery.  Businesses are allowed to prod and encourage the 
consumer to purchase a diverse range of products through a barrage of 
advertising.  Consumers are told that they can gain an added peace of 
mind, comfort, and security in the use of these products by purchasing 
extended warranties and service plans.  What they are not told is that the 
legislature has allowed and encouraged many businesses to sell this 
added protection without providing the consumer anything of substance.  
Apparently, it is now legally and commercially acceptable to stand behind 
your product just as long as that does not mean expending any money. 
Caveat emptor is not dead but alive in a different suit. 
I. Introduction 
II. The History of Consumer Protection in Express Warranties 
Show a Time Gone By 
III. Consumer Rights Stripped Away as a Result of an Online 
Transaction 
A.  The FTC Gives the Consumer a Helping Hand 
B. Times Are a Changing? 
IV. Can the U.C.C. Warranty of Merchantability Rescue the 
Consumer? 
A. The Code Giveth and the Code Taketh Away 
B. How Can They Understand That Which They Have Never 
Heard? 
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V. The States Give the Drowning Consumer a Raft with a Hole in it 
A.  Not to Worry Aren’t All Service Contracts the Same? 
B. The Creators of the Code Justify Their Failure 
VI. Proposed Federal Rule 
VII. Conclusion 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, the purchase of goods involved a long, drawn out 
negotiation between a consumer and a local proprietor of the goods.   
Selection of products was limited and good customer service was a 
prerequisite of a good business.  Purchasing goods generally involved a 
face-to-face meeting with people you knew and trusted, whose local 
reputation was literally on the line.  That face-to-face meeting helped 
instill a corresponding trust between the consumer and the merchant and 
the merchant's commitment to quality and fulfill the purchaser’s trust.  
“Today with the advent of the internet, people are able to 
instantaneously form contracts and do so across the globe.”1 However, 
as the personal connection between proprietor and purchaser has 
gradually been removed from the sales process, the notions of trust and 
commitment seem to have become less important. 
II. THE HISTORY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION IN EXPRESS 
WARRANTIES SHOW A TIME GONE BY 
It is precisely this lack of face-to-face meeting between the 
consumer and purchaser that requires the need for consumer product 
protection.  But how does that protection arise?  We must first examine 
the initial contract that brings about the opportunity to purchase the 
additional extended warranty or the service contract.  The Uniform 
Commercial Code (the “U.C.C.” or “Code”) governs the initial contract 
for a sale of goods.2 This generally refers to the purchase of an item, 
referred to as a “good” from your local brick-and-mortar store or from 
an online purveyor. 3 
                                                 
1 Amelia Rawls, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
200, 202 (2009) (“[t]echnological innovation has ushered in a new commercial era, with 
communication between contracting parties occurring in the blink of an eye”). 
2 U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002). 
3 U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002) (“[T]his Article applies to transactions in goods. . .”). 
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The term “‘[g]oods” means all things . . . which are movable at 
the time of identification to a contract for sale."4 For the most part these 
contracts are creatures of the U.C.C. and the common-law and/or state 
statutes modifying them. 
The U.C.C. "does not apply to any transaction which although in 
the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended 
to operate only as a security transaction nor does this Article impair or repeal 
any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of buyers.”5 
While Article 2 of the U.C.C. applies to the initial purchase of 
goods, it does not apply to the additional purchase of the extended 
warranty or the extended service contract because these are contracts for 
service, which do not fall within the U.C.C.’s definition of a good.6 
Therefore, extended warranty or extended service contracts are governed 
by common law. 
Depending on the state, some states view these warranties as 
contracts for service that fall outside of the U.C.C., while others view 
these as contracts of insurance.7 
In the normal course of purchasing a product, the consumer will 
come across various types of express warranties.  These warranties are 
governed by various Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") rules.8  They 
are also creatures of contract and as such are most likely drafted by an 
attorney.   FTC regulations require that the language used be “clear, easy 
to read, and contain certain specified items of information about its 
coverage.”9  Despite this requirement there is no definition of what is 
clear and easy to read.10 
                                                 
4 U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2002). 
5 U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002) (emphasis added). 
6 U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (2002). 
7 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 149N (West 2011). 
8 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (1975). 
9 FTC PUBLICATION—A BUSINESSPERSON'S GUIDE TO FEDERAL WARRANTY LAW 
(2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/businesspersons-
guide-federal-warranty-law; see generally 16 C.F.R. § 701.3 (2015) (setting forth the exact 
statutory language); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (1975). 
10 See 16 C.F.R. § 701 (2015). 
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Federal law requires that a consumer be given an opportunity to 
review a warranty prior to purchase.  Yet, a recent article explaining 
warranties to the general public would suggest that the average person 
does not have the requisite understanding of warranty language to 
appreciate what the warranty is and/or what it might cover either 
expressly or impliedly.11  Even if a consumer is aware of the right to 
review the warranty, store policy and accompanying store logistics may 
make that review by the consumer difficult or near impossible.  Retail 
electronic stores carry thousands of different products.  How likely is it 
that the store would keep, for easy retrieval, all of these individual 
warranties? What sales floor space are they willing to sacrifice so that the 
consumer can sit and read this disclosure?  The following example from 
Consumer Reports is illustrative of the consumer’s problem: 
When Melodie Eisenberg of Decatur, Ga., went to Best 
Buy for a computer modem and asked to see the 
warranty, “the salesperson acted like I was some nut job 
asking for something weird” and refused to open the 
box, she recalls. Eisenberg says the salesperson had first 
tried to sell her a service contract, presumably to 
supplement the unknown benefits of the warranty. 
When she complained to Best Buy headquarters, she 
was told that the employee was not allowed to open the 
package.”12 
This story highlights the trouble with the status of the current 
law.  Despite the fact that under the FTC regulation the consumer is 
allowed to view a warranty prior to purchase, store policy, at least as at 
Best Buy, makes that necessary review impossible.13   It is interesting to 
note that the same regulation requires manufacturers to provide sellers 
with these warranties.14 
One can only wonder where the many retailers are storing all of 
those warranties they have been given.  Perhaps they are with Tootles’ 
                                                 
11 What You Need to Know About Warranty Laws: You Have More Rights than You Might 
Think, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 2013), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2013/05/the-word-on-warranty-
protection/index.htm. 
12 Id. 
13 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(a) (2015). 
14 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(b) (2015). 
2015] EXTENDED WARRANTIES, THE GREAT LIE: 39 
     WHY THE KING HAS NO CLOTHES 
 
marbles in Neverland, an aptly named repository for these warranties.  It 
would be nice if this was a fantasy but, unfortunately, this is a harsh 
reality being borne by the consumers in this country. 
III. CONSUMER RIGHTS STRIPPED AWAY AS A RESULT OF AN ONLINE 
TRANSACTION 
Many times assumptions made by the legislature when creating a 
rule or statute, though initially valid, may lose their validity or even 
become invalid over time.  We will see how an initial purported 
protection completely misses the mark in today’s online world. 
A.  The FTC Gives the Consumer a Helping Hand 
Though the FTC regulation appears to require that warranty 
materials be made available to a purchaser of a good at the time of 
purchase, the regulation contains an interesting anomaly as it applies to 
catalogue sales and, by extension, internet-based sales.  The regulation 
does not require a catalogue or mail order house to provide the 
consumer with a copy of the product’s warranty prior to purchase.15  
Instead, it allows the seller to either post a copy of the warranty in the 
catalogue (a rather cumbersome and unlikely method) or to make it 
possible for the consumer to request a copy of the warranty by mail 
whereupon the seller must mail it to the consumer free of charge.16 
This exception might seem unusual given the FTC’s initial 
requirement for brick and mortar stores to make warranty information 
available to consumers at the time of purchase.  This difference in 
treatment is clarified when we examine the difference between the two 
purchasing experiences in their historical time frame.  This regulation 
was drafted in 1975, a time when the purchasing experience was quite 
different than it is today.17 There was no online market experience.18 
                                                 
15 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(c) (2015). 
16 Id. 
17 Legal Information Institute, 16 CFR Part 702 – Pre-Sale Availability of Written Warranty 
Terms, CORNELL UNIV. LAW SCH, https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/16/part-702, 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
18 iShift Staff, The History of Online Shopping in Nutshell, INSTANTSHIFT (Mar. 26, 2010), 
http://www.instantshift.com/2010/03/26/the-history-of-online-shopping-in-nutshell. 
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In the 1970’s, based on certain sections of the regulation, a 
consumer, who was physically present in a store and ready to make a 
purchase, would have the ability to review the warranty prior to 
purchase.19  The underlying rationale for this was that presumably a 
consumer had traveled to the store, examined the product, and was 
intent on making his purchase at that moment.  He had committed time 
and expense in this endeavor.  The purchase decision was one that 
would have been made after reviewing all of the relevant data and 
warranty terms.  Therefore, having the ability to review all the terms of 
the transaction prior to committing to the purchase was important.  
Should the warranty terms be unsatisfactory, the purchaser, having all of 
the facts at hand, could refuse to consummate the transaction and 
choose to leave or modify his purchase strategy. 
The catalogue or mail order purchaser, however, is not under the 
same time constraints or potential purchasing pressures that befall the 
brick and mortar purchaser.  The catalogue purchaser is contemplating 
his purchase in the comfort of his home.  Other than taking the time to 
peruse the catalogue he has not committed much in the way of time or 
resources in making his choice.  He most likely does not need the item 
immediately and can afford to wait for the item to arrive some weeks 
later.  Indeed, it was expected that an item purchased from a catalogue 
would be mailed out, and the item’s receipt would arrive some time later.  
Contrast this with the purchase of an item needed immediately.  If the 
item were immediately needed, the purchaser would physically go to 
their local brick and mortar purveyor and purchase the item then and 
there. This would require having all of the facts needed to make an 
informed choice a necessity. These timing and purchasing differences 
were not lost on the FTC.  Given the assumed delay in catalogue 
purchases, it seems logical for the FTC to allow the seller time to mail 
the warranty to the purchaser.  The mail order purchaser was already 
expecting a delay in obtaining his item so the additional delay for a 
warranty to arrive seemed to be an acceptable concession for the 
convenience of not having to leave one’s home. 
B.  Times Are a Changing 
This difference in treatment by the FTC, which made sense back 
in 1975 when in-store sales accounted for the lion’s share of all sales, 
                                                 
19 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(a)-(b) (2015). 
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may in fact be misplaced in today’s economy.20  Today, the scales have 
turned.  Online purchases have increased dramatically.  According to the 
National Retail Federation, (“NRF”), “56 percent [of holiday shoppers] 
plan to shop online, up from 51.5 percent last year and the most in the 
survey’s 13-year history. Additionally, the average person plans to do 
44.4 percent of their shopping online, the most since NRF first asked in 
2006”.21   This purchasing change will have a dramatic effect on the 
consumer’s ability to access warranty information since an online 
transaction appears to fall within the rubric of a catalogue sale as to a sale 
made at a brick and mortar store. FTC regulations specify that: 
(i) Catalog or mail order sales means any offer for sale, or 
any solicitation for an order for a consumer product 
with a written warranty, which includes instructions for 
ordering the product which do not require a personal 
visit to the seller’s establishment.22 
Note that the definition of catalogue or mail order is  “any offer 
for sale . . .for a consumer product . . . which does not require a personal 
visit to the seller’s establishment.”23  This definition fits squarely with the 
description of an online purchase which, generally, is a consumer 
purchase where the consumer is not visiting the seller’s establishment.  
The difference between the catalogue sale or mail order sale and the 
online transaction is that they involve very different communication 
media and the expectation of service provided has dramatically changed 
over the last 40 years. 
Historically catalogues were of limited size and the larger the 
catalogue the more costly it was to post warranty information.  To 
include warranty language for every product would cause the catalogue 
to be many thousands of pages long depending on the number of items 
included in the catalogue. Requiring a catalogue seller to include warranty 
                                                 
20 Catalog and Mail-Order Houses, REFERENCE FOR BUSINESS, 
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/industries/Retail-Trade/Catalog-Mail-Order-
Houses.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
21 Kathy Grannis, Gift Givers Plan to Splurge on Friends, Family this Holiday Season, 
NATIONAL RETAIL FEDERATION (Oct. 16, 2014), https://nrf.com/media/press-
releases/gift-givers-plan-splurge-friends-family-this-holiday-season.  
22 16 CFR § 702.3(c)(i) (2015) (emphasis added). 
23 Id. 
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language for each product was simply not economically feasible in the 
1970’s; thus, the FTC’s allowed the seller to send the warranty to the 
consumer by mail.  However, this physical limitation is not present with 
the online purveyor.  In answer to the question "How many pages can a 
web site have?",  Google’s search engine responded with approximately 
520 million pages of data in 0.58 seconds.  This  suggests that online 
catalogues are no longer constrained by the limitations of size or weight. 
Additionally, the delay in receipt of an item purchased via 
catalogue is not a factor in online transactions, leaving no remaining 
justification for not requiring the immediate availability of a warranty to 
the purchaser. Many online services such as Amazon have free two-day 
shipping and one-day shipping at a minimal cost, so it is possible for a 
consumer to order the product from the convenience of their home, and 
then have the item delivered the very next day.24 
Though traditional paper mail order transactions in the current 
market may be smaller than brick and mortar purchases, online 
purchasing is now becoming a significant purchasing phenomenon.25  
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, “E-commerce shipments 
approached half of all manufacturing shipments as e-commerce 
shipments were 49.3 percent of all manufacturing shipments in 2011, up 
from a revised 47.9 percent in 2010.”26  
The FTC’s justifications for not requiring a seller to make all 
warranty information available to catalogue purchasers, and now by 
extension online purchasers is clearly outdated.  There is no longer an 
economic constraint by way of postage, nor is there the expectation on 
the part of the purchasing public that the online purchase will somehow 
be slow in delivery.  In 2014, Apple ranked first among online retailers 
with an average delivery time of 2.3 days.27  The comparatively slower 
pace of life in the 1970’s is in stark contrast to today’s electronic means 
                                                 
24 Amazon Prime Shipping Benefits, AMAZON.COM, 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201118070 (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
25 2011 E-Stats, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2011/2011reportfinal.pdf. 
26 Id. 
27 Mikey Campbell, Apple Order Fulfillment Ranks First Among Online Retailers with Average 
Delivery Time of 2.3 Days in June, APPLE INSIDER (July 30, 2014), 
http://appleinsider.com/articles/14/07/30/apple-order-fulfillment-ranks-first-among-
online-retailers-with-average-delivery-time-of-23-days-in-june.  
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of communication and purchasing possibilities.  Improved technology 
has given rise to the “Now Generation,” a group who looks for instant 
gratification and who now purchases not only locally but interstate with 
great ease.28  
So where can we look to find a statutory authority designed to 
bridge the gap amongst the states and give the consumers of varying 
states their needed protection? Of Course, the venerable Uniform 
Commercial Code, isn’t that why it was proposed? 
IV. CAN THE U.C.C. WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY RESCUE THE 
CONSUMER? 
Given that  express warranties are contracts whose creation is 
controlled by the seller of the good and unlikely to benefit the buyer, 
buyers are often forced to rely on implied warranties such as the implied 
warranty of merchantability. Implied warranties are governed by sections 
2-314 through 2-316 of the U.C.C.29 Section 2-314 of the U.C.C. deals 
specifically with the implied warranty of merchantability.30 
Section 2-314 requires that the good “pass without objection in 
the trade . . .and be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods 
are used.”31  From that, consumers should expect that an item will 
perform its intended function in a way that meets it purpose; consumers 
should be reasonably satisfied with the functioning quality of their recent 
purchase. 
The official comments to section 2-314 of the U.C.C. makes it 
clear that “[g]oods delivered under an agreement made by a merchant in 
a given line of trade must be of a quality comparable to that generally 
acceptable in that line of trade . . . .”32  The comments to section 2-314 
also suggest that the definition of what is to be considered merchantable 
was to be very broadly interpreted.33  The language chosen was done 
                                                 
28 Now Generation Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/now+generation (last visited June 20, 2015). 
29 U.C.C. §§ 2-314 to -316 (2002). 
30 U.C.C. § 2-314 (2002).  
31 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a)-(c) (2002). 
32 U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 2 (2002). 
33 Id.  
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with an eye towards allowing inclusivity of other potential definitions of 
the word merchantable.34 
So the idea of merchantability reflects the notion that a 
manufacturer must make a good that is fit for its ordinary use, or stated 
differently, the good should be such that the average person would not 
object.35  For most people it is easy to see when the item is not 
merchantable.  It is that place where your new jacket’s zipper breaks and 
you exclaim, “I just bought this jacket how could this happen?” 
A.  The Code Giveth and the Code Taketh Away 
Despite this purported protection afforded to the consumer 
when purchasing from a merchant, the Code allows for the limiting of 
the warranty of merchantability.  Specifically, section 2-316 of the Code 
gives the merchant the ability to exclude the warranty of merchantability 
by so stating in a conspicuous manner.36 
Thus, on the one hand section 2-314 creates an implied warranty 
of merchantability: a basic protection as to the level or quality of the 
product which would be average in the general trade or usage of the 
product.37  Yet, section 2-316 gives merchants the ability to negate this 
warranty of merchantability whenever they choose.38 I think we can take 
as a given that most manufacturers and/or sellers would and, in fact, do  
delete the implied warranty of merchantability by using the exception 
created by section 2-316. 
One might wonder why the creators of the U.C.C., back in 1952, 
decided to include section 2-314 at all given it its ability to be mitigated 
by section 2- 316. The comments to 2-316 provide this  explanation: 
 
                                                 
34 Id. (“Subsection (2) does not purport to exhaust the meaning of ‘merchantable’ nor 
to negate any of its attributes not specifically mentioned in the text of the statute, but 
arising by usage of trade or through case law. The language used is ‘must be at least 
such as . . . ,’ and the intention is to leave open other possible attributes of 
merchantability.”). 
35 Id. 
36 U.C.C. § 2-316 (2002) (“to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability 
or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing 
must be conspicuous”). 
37 U.C.C. § 2-314 (2002). 
38 U.C.C. § 2-316 (2002). 
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It [2-316] seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and 
unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to 
such language when inconsistent with language of 
express warranty and permitting the exclusion of 
implied warranties only by conspicuous language or 
other circumstances which protect the buyer from 
surprise.39 
 
These comments suggest that the writers of this section were in 
fact attempting to protect the buyer from something which is 
unexpected and unbargained for.  Given that most consumers are never 
given the opportunity to negotiate the warranty for their product, how is 
it then that this contract of adhesion is bargained for at all?  How many 
of us when purchasing an item online or at a brick and mortar store have 
the opportunity to negotiate the included warranty?  How many of us 
even see the warranty prior to purchase, given that it is usually placed 
inside a sealed box with the item we just purchased? 
These rhetorical questions lead to the inevitable conclusion that, 
in reality, the average consumer has not negotiated the warranty contract 
with the manufacturer, and is generally not informed that his remedy is 
limited to those conditions stated on the express warranty which is 
typically located inside the box of the item he has just purchased.  
Therefore,  the commenter’s statement that section 2-316, “seeks to 
protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of 
disclaimer” has no practical effect given that the disclaimer, though 
conspicuously displayed as required by section 2-316, is inside a sealed 
box and cannot be viewed until the consumer has brought the item 
home!40 
B.  How Can They Understand That Which They Have Never Heard? 
The comments also allude to a desire to prevent the buyer from 
being surprised by “an unexpected . . . disclaimer” of the warranty of 
merchantability.41 Is it reasonable to assume that the average consumer 
would even know what a warranty of merchantability was if he saw it? In 
                                                 
39 U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 1 (2002) (emphasis added).  
40 Id. (emphasis added). 
41 Id. 
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1952 when the U.C.C. was created, “the median educational attainment 
of 25- to 29-years-olds rose to 12 years.”42 “By 1960, 42 percent of 
males, 25 years old and over, still had completed no more than the eighth 
grade, but 40 percent had completed high school and 10 percent had 
completed 4 years of college.”43  Therefore, when section 2-316 of the 
U.C.C. was created, to presumably protect the consumer from 
unexpected deletion of the implied warranty of merchantability, 88 
percent of the American public had a high school education at best.44  
How many high school graduates in 1952 would have been exposed to 
the concept of an implied warranty much less have knowledge of the 
implied warranty of merchantability?  It would seem that the Code’s 
creators falsely assumed that the American public were all legal scholars. 
Now advance forward to today, sixty plus years from the Code’s 
creation.  How does the average citizen compare to the average 
purchaser presupposed by the creators of the Code?  According to the 
United States Census Bureau, “5 percent  of the public have less than an 
8th grade education, 7.3 percent of the public have an educational level 
between 9th and 11th grade, and 30.3 percent of the public have graduated 
high school.”45  Therefore, roughly 42 percent of the American public 
has at best a high school education or less.46 If we look at the 
benchmarks for higher education, 26.3 percent of the public have 
attained an associate’s degree or have taken some college courses with 
19.8 of the public having graduated college.47  These government 
statistics demonstrate that 68.3 percent of the American public, that 
would be two-thirds of the American public, has not achieved an 
education higher than an associate’s degree and less than half of the 
public has not even earned a high school diploma.48  Thus, the folly of 
the Code’s creators is evidenced by comment 1 of section 2-316 which 
provides an impossible justification for stripping away consumer 
                                                 
42 120 Years of Literacy, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, 
http://nces.ed.gov/naal/lit_history.asp (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Educational Attainment in the United States: 2012, U.S. CENUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2012/tables.html (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 Id.   
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protections outlined in section 2-314. 
I think that we can all agree that unless we are lawyers, legal 
educators, or lovers of the U.C.C. most members of society are neither 
aware of their rights under the implied warranty of merchantability, nor 
are they aware of what its disclaimer might mean to them.  This 
statement is not meant to be a criticism of the educational level of the 
citizenry in the United States but, rather, an acknowledgement of the 
failure of the writers of the Code to adequately protect the public as to 
the implied warranty of merchantability.  There are at least two 
possibilities for this error. The writers either overestimated what the 
public knew or could reasonably be expected to know pertaining to 
warranties, both express and implied, or knowingly chose to side with 
businesses as opposed to consumers in an effort to have the Code 
uniformly adopted throughout the country.  I hope that it was the 
former. 
Despite their zealous optimism of the public’s knowledge of 
warranties, the reality of the public’s perception of a well-made product, 
i.e. one that is merchantable, seems to be much like the Supreme Court’s 
idea of pornography, “I know it when I see it.”49 The dictionary defines 
merchantability as “a product of a high enough quality to make it fit for 
sale. To be merchantable an article for sale must be usable for the 
purpose it is made.”50 The concept that it be usable for the purpose it 
was made is inherent in the purchase of all items by consumers.  None 
of us would pay for an item not fit for its intended purpose.  In fact 
many of us have very definite opinions about what products are made 
“well” and which products are “junk”.  The public’s expectation that the 
product will perform as intended is demonstrated by the average 
consumer’s reaction to a product that fails prematurely. How many of us 
have purchased a shirt or a blouse only to have a button fall off 
prematurely within the first month and then exclaim, “How could this 
happen? This is brand new!”  The heartfelt indignation, the frustration, 
the feeling of betrayal all underscore the point that consumers believe 
that products should be fit for sale and last for a reasonable period of 
time.  All of these notions are very much in keeping with the implied 
warranty of merchantability.  The average consumer may not know the 
                                                 
49 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). 
50 Merchantability Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/merchantability (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
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term merchantability, per se, but he does know it when he sees it. 
The days of caveat emptor51 have slowly waned in other areas of the 
law.52  Both Federal and State laws now require sellers of real property to 
disclose lead paint issues, and other hazardous substance issues to 
prospective purchasers.53 
Some states, have statutes which prohibit sellers from engaging 
in unfair and deceptive trade practices.54 Massachusetts, for example, has 
enacted a statute that grants the public another possible avenue for 
consumer redress for a defective product, conflict-of-laws issues aside.55  
The statute also incorporates a broad definition of what constitutes 
“trade” giving the consumer further latitude.56  Massachusetts enacted 
this law in 1967 in an effort to give the private individual the power to 
bring an action against a seller or manufacturer who engaged in such 
unfair and deceptive trade practice.57  This was a remedy not available to 
the consumer at the time under the FTC regulations.58 
The use of the word “unfair” in the Massachusetts statute seems 
to underscore the State’s desire to address a more common 
understanding of the problem59.  It is not speaking legalistically about 
merchantability or about other more specific and complicated legal 
                                                 
51 Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well-Informed? – Doubting the Demise of Caveat 
Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387, 388 fn. 5 (1996).  
52 Id. at 388-89.  
53 Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4851-4856 
(2006); see, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-24.6-16 (West 2002). 
54 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1967) (“Unfair methods of competition 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are 
hereby declared unlawful.”).  
55 Id. 
56 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 1 (West 1967) (“‘[t]rade’ and ‘commerce’ shall 
include the advertising, the offering for sale, rent or lease, the sale, rent, lease or 
distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or 
mixed, any security . . . and any contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, and 
any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate, and shall include any 
trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this commonwealth”). 
57 RE04RC12: M.G.L. c. 93A, Consumer Protection & Business Regulation, MASS.GOV, 
http://www.mass.gov/ocabr/licensee/dpl-boards/re/ceu/continuing-education-
subject-matter-curricula/reo4rc12.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
58 Id. 
59 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1967). 
2015] EXTENDED WARRANTIES, THE GREAT LIE: 49 
     WHY THE KING HAS NO CLOTHES 
 
theories, but rather attempts to address the simpler theory of fairness.  
This demonstrates society’s desire to move away from the maxim, ‘Let 
the buyer beware’ to one of embracing an obligation on those engaged in 
trade to be fair.  And it is this concept which viscerally I think we can all 
relate to, unfortunately is difficult to define in a practical way.  Again 
many of us know fairness when we see it, but find it difficult to define in 
the abstract. 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines unfair as “1. marked by 
injustice, partiality, or deception. 2.  Not equitable in business dealings.” 
 Thus, it appears that the public generally knows, subjectively, 
when something is unfair, but is most likely unaware of the actual legal 
effect of the various types of warranties that exist, as well the impact of 
these warranties on their specific transaction. 
V. THE STATES GIVE THE DROWNING CONSUMER A RAFT WITH A 
HOLE IN IT 
It is important to review how various state statutes handle service 
contracts and extended warranty contracts due to the degree of variation 
of protection afforded the consumer in these states. Given the rise of 
online purchases the likelihood is that a consumer will not be purchasing 
their products locally such that when they are buying the service contact 
or extended warranty they may find themselves at the mercy of state law 
very different from their own. I have chosen the states below based on 
their degree of geographic diversity to provide a broad picture of how 
the consumer is treated and to also highlight the fact that the consumer 
may be treated very differently depending on where in the country they 
make their purchase. 
A.  Not To Worry, Aren’t All Service Contracts the Same? 
Alaska for example defines a service contract as “(1)… a service 
contract or agreement for separate or additional consideration, for a 
specified duration to (A) maintain, service or repair tangible personal 
property.”60   Yet this language specifically excludes “portable electronic 
insurance as defined in AS 21.36.515”, which covers a myriad of small 
electronic devices.61 
                                                 
60 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 21.03.021 (West 2014). 
61 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 21.36.515 (West 2014) (portable electronic insurance means 
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Their definition seems to blur the lines between what one might 
consider a traditional warranty or an implied warranty. Though they 
classify maintenance, service, and repair work pursuant to a contract to 
be a service contract, what then would be an extended warranty?  Is not 
the idea of a warranty one where the broken item can be serviced or 
repaired?  No mention is made in the Alaska statute of when the 
contract must be provided or what it must contain. 
Arkansas differentiates a motor vehicle service contract from any 
other type of service contract, allowing the purchaser of a motor vehicle 
service contract to cancel the contract within thirty days of purchase 
provided that no claim is made.62  The retailer may also charge a 
cancellation fee of not more than fifty dollars. 63  Despite this seemingly 
inspiring beginning towards protecting consumers, the statute takes a 
dramatic turn rather rapidly when it comes to other service contracts, 
presumably where online transactions will sit. 
In the non-automotive online service contract, the retailer is only 
required “to provide the consumer with a receipt for their purchase of 
the contract and then must provide a copy of the service contract to the 
service contract holder within a reasonable period of time from the date 
of purchase.”64  The wording of the statute allows the retailer to sell a 
service contract to the consumer with the consumer never having even 
seen the contract until after he purchases it. The only protection being 
that the consumer would have a receipt indicating that he purchased the 
contract, yet would have no idea, other than what was told to him by the 
sales clerk what the contract encompasses. Apparently these service 
contracts are treated much like a pot luck dinner. You pay your fee to 
attend and then receive whatever happens to be there. 
Given that a service contract is not a good, its contract formation 
would be governed under the common law. One might ask how contract 
formation is even achieved if the consumer never sees the contract he 
has allegedly purchased until after the transaction is consummated. Can 
                                                                                                                   
“insurance offered, issued for delivery, delivered, or  renewed by a vendor engaged in 
the business of selling, leasing, or servicing  portable electronic devices to cover the 
loss, theft, mechanical failure, malfunction, damage, repair, or replacement of a small 
electronic device,  including a cell phone, laptop computer, GPS device, radio, portable 
music player, or associated accessory”). 
62 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-90-507 (West 2012).  
63 Id. 
64 ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-114-104 (West 2009) (emphasis added). 
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there be a meeting of the minds when only one party knows of the term 
of the contract? 
California, has an extremely comprehensive statute which does 
not separate out motor vehicle service contracts. 65  Their Consumer 
Protection Statute in Section 1794 as a whole also initially grants what 
appears to be a broad based protection for the consumer.66 
It requires presentation of the contract or a brochure which 
specifically describes the terms, conditions, and exclusions of the 
contract prior to purchase,67 contrary to Arkansas’ statute. Then, it sets 
out, that within the service contract  the language used must, “fully and 
conspicuously discloses in simple and readily understood language the 
terms, conditions, and exclusions of that contract.” 68  Though the statute 
does not identify the definition of “simple and readily understood 
language”69 it does suggest by the verbiage chosen that the language to 
be used must be other than what one might traditionally see in a 
contract, i.e., legalese.  Despite its positive disclosure requirements such 
as, “fees, charges, and other costs that the buyer must pay to obtain 
service,"70 and “the method of giving notice to the service contract seller 
of the need for service”71 the statute makes little demands on the Seller 
of the service contract as to what services must be provided.  In fact, 
though the statute seemingly attempts to mandate a minimal level of 
service it nullifies that requirement later on in the statute.72 
The net result here is that that the California statute, while 
mandating many disclosures in simple language, in reality does little to 
mandate what protections must be offered in the service contract. 73 And 
though the statute does allow the service contract to supplement the 
                                                 
65 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794.41 (West 2011). 
66 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794.4 (West 2008). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794.4(5)(I) (West 2008). 
71 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794.4(5)(E) (West 2008). 
72 Id. (“[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in the service contract . . .”). 
73 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794.4 (West 2008). 
52   TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW   [Vol. 17 
 
warranty, (whose content is controlled by the Seller),74 their own U.C.C. 
2-316 allows for the removal of the implied warranty of 
merchantability.75  Additionally, California has adopted U.C.C. article 2-
317, which provides that express warranties take priority over 
inconsistent implied warranties.76 
Thus, though the statute has many interesting elements, the 
ultimate benefit offered to the consumer is still in the control of the 
Seller. Therefore, the implied warranty of merchantability will in all 
likelihood be disclaimed, and the express warranty will be narrowed so as 
to only benefit the Seller. The major difference exhibited by California’s 
treatment being that the consumer will at least know of the poor deal he 
is getting himself into. 
Connecticut approaches the issue in an interesting fashion in that 
their descriptions of a service contract and that of a warranty or 
extended warranty seem to overlap. 
Under the Connecticut tax code, contracts for repairing or 
maintaining tangible property fall into three classifications. Those where 
the item is to be maintained, known as a maintenance contract, those 
where the contract is to repair an item which is in need of repair at the 
time of contract formation, a repair contract, and those where the repair 
is to be provided in the future, known as a warranty or guaranty 
contract.77   “Warranty or Guaranty contracts are contracts that provide for 
repair service only in the event of a future malfunctioning of an item of 
tangible personal property.”78 
They also define extended warranty contracts thusly elsewhere in 
the Connecticut code: 
                                                 
74 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794.4(a) (West 2008) (“[n]othing in this chapter shall be 
construed to prevent the sale of a service contract to the buyer in addition to, or in lieu 
of, an express warranty . . .”). 
75 CAL. COM. CODE § 2316(3)(a) (West 2014) (“[u]nless the circumstances indicate 
otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like ‘as is,’ ‘with all faults’ 
or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer’s attention to the 
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty.”). 
76 WEST'S ANN. CAL. COM. CODE § 2317 (West 2015). 
77 State of Conn. Dep’t of Revenue Services, Policy Statement 94(2), CT.GOV, 
http://www.ct.gov/drs/cwp/view.asp?A=1511&Q=267264  (last visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
78 Id.   
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“1) Extended warranty” means a contract or agreement to 
either perform or provide indemnification for the repair, 
replacement or maintenance of a product because of 
operational or structural failure of such product due to a 
defect in materials, skill or workmanship or normal wear 
and tear given for consideration over and above the lease 
or purchase price of a product.79 
Connecticut has very similar extended warranty disclosure 
requirements to California.80  Yet again, as with California, exactly what 
the warranty or extended warranty covers is left up to the Seller. Though 
the statute seems to offer extensive consumer protection in the form of 
disclosure, it follows the same path as California, form over substance. If 
what is disclosed is inadequate coverage and is done so in a manner 
which is cumbersome to read then what protection is the extended 
warranty providing? 
Connecticut’s U.C.C. Article 2-314 follows the standard U.C.C. 
language of allowing there to be an implied warranty of merchantability,81 
but then allows that to be excluded via U.C.C. 2-316, which allows for 
the removal of these warranties by the use of the words “as is” and by 
conspicuously noting that the warranty of merchantability is being 
excluded.82  They have also adopted U.C.C. 2-317 which makes express 
warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties of merchantability.83 
As with prior states the benefit or protection to the consumer is 
narrowed to the Seller’s advantage by Connecticut’s U.C.C. Section 2-
317. 
B. The Creators of the Code Justify their Failure 
A brief look at the comments associated with the creation of 2-
317 is illuminating on how the drafters viewed U.C.C. 2-317. 
                                                 
79 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-260 (West 2014). 
80 Id. 
81 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-314 (West 2014); see also U.C.C. § 2-314 (2002).  
82 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-316 (West 2014). 
83 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-2-317 (West 2014); see also U.C.C. § 2-317 (2002). 
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Official Comment § 2-317 
3. The rules in subsections (a), (b) and (c) are designed to 
ascertain the intention of the parties by reference to the 
factor which probably claimed the attention of the 
parties in the first instance. (emphasis added) These 
rules are not absolute but may be changed by evidence 
showing that the conditions which existed at the time of 
contracting make the construction called for by the section 
inconsistent or unreasonable.84 
The commentators to the Code suggest that reliance on the 
express warranty and the allowance of the disclaimer of the implied 
warranty is somehow acceptable for the consumer because, the express 
warranty and its subsequent disclaimer, “probably claimed the attention 
of the parties,”85 and one would presume was a negotiated part of the 
contract. This supposition flies in the face of the fact that a large part of 
the population have, at best, a high school education, and relies upon the 
absurd notion that they would know about the implied warranty of 
merchantability.86  Additionally, how can a warranty be negotiated if it is 
a pre-printed form contained inside of a box?  Lastly Connecticut does 
not disclose when the warranty or extended warranty need be given to 
the consumer. 
We have now looked at states from the upper most part of our 
country, from the West coast, from the Midwest and from the East 
coast, it would seem appropriate to look at a State which is our 
Southernmost State. 
In Hawaii, service agreements are differentiated from warranties 
both express and implied and maintenance agreements. These latter 
three agreements are excluded from Haw. Rev Stat. 481X-187  The 
Statute does make excellent distinction between a service contract, a 
warranty, and a maintenance contract.88 
                                                 
84 U.C.C. § 2-317 cmt. 3 (2002) (emphasis added). 
85 Id. 
86 Educational Attainment in the United States: 2012, U.S. CENUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2012/tables.html (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2015). 
87 HAW. REV. STAT. § 481X-1 (West 2000). 
88 HAW. REV. STAT. § 481X-2 (West 2000). 
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The “Provider”89 of the service contract comply with the State’s 
requirements for selling service contracts, which include having either a 
suitable amount of reserves to cover those outstanding contracts or 
some type of insurance policy to cover same or other requirements as set 
forth by the State.90 This statute is similar to California’s requirement that 
the provider give the purchaser a receipt for the contract and also 
provide the purchaser with the availability of a basic copy of the 
contract.91 The actual contract need not be provided at the time of sale 
but must be sent to the purchaser within a reasonable period of time.92 
Yet again, as with the other states we discussed, Hawaii has 
adopted sections 2-314 and 2-316 of the U.C.C.,93 which allows for the 
creation of both express and implied warranties, but also allows for their 
removal via section 2-316 of the U.C.C.94 The net result here is the same 
sad story with the consumer left to the vagaries of the service contract 
that he purchases but receives after the transaction.95  Though the statute 
does necessitate that the contract be written in clear and understandable 
language, it does not define what that means.96 
After the purchase of the service contract is made, the actual 
contract arrives at the purchaser’s home, presumably in an 
understandable format, and now the consumer is allowed to cancel the 
contract within 30 days and receive a refund, if he is not satisfied with 
the terms of the contract.97  Yet, given that most purchasers are not 
lawyers, legal scholars, or commentators to the U.C.C., what is the 
likelihood that the purchaser will exercise that option? 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 HAW. REV. STAT. § 481X-4 (West 2000). 
91 Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794.4 (West 2008). 
92 HAW. REV. STAT. § 481X-6 (West 2000).  
93 HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:2-314-16 (West 2014); see also U.C.C. § 2-314 (2002); U.C.C. § 
2-316 (2002). 
94 HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:2-314-16 (West 2014). 
95 Id. 
96 HAW. REV. STAT. § 481X-6 (West 2000) (“[s]ervice contracts shall be written in clear, 
understandable language, and shall be printed or typed in a typeface and format that is 
easy to read”). 
97 HAW. REV. STAT. § 481X-7 (West 2000). 
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I suggest that given the purchaser’s unfamiliarity with contract 
language, the likelihood of a purchaser reading the contract in its entirety 
and comprehending its contents is slim. If the purchaser does read and 
understand the contract, cancelling it involves taking additional 
affirmative action on the purchaser’s part; one must notify the provider 
of his or her displeasure with the contract then return the product to the 
provider.98  This would require the purchaser to mail the contract back to 
the provider along with a letter of explanation. In today’s digital society 
how many of us will go through that process?  The U.S. Postal Service 
indicates that since 2008, the total U.S. volume of mail has dropped by 
21%.99  So, again, the purchaser is potentially denied the implied 
warranty of merchantability, left to the contractual savvy of the provider 
in the creation of their express warranty, and also to the left subject to 
the provider’s terms as set forth in its their service contract which will 
arrive for inspection by the consumer after the purchase is made.100 
VI. A PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE 
In furtherance of re-establishing the balance between the 
consumers and those they interact with, I propose that the following 
language be enacted, as adapted from the proposed languages above, as a 
Federal Statute or FTC Rule in lieu of the existing laws governing 
warranties: 
Proposed Federal Statute or FTC Regulation. 
The following rule shall apply to any contract or 
agreement for which the consumer pays a separately 
stated consideration over and above the initial purchase 
price of the good, for the repair, replacement, or 
maintenance of the product or good for operational or 
structural failure due either to a defect in materials or 
artisanship, or due to normal wear and tear for repair or 
service to the product. This rule is intended to cover all 
contracts or agreements which heretofore may have 
been referred to as service contracts, extended service 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 John Bacon & Donna Leinwand Leger, Postal Service to End Saturday Letter Delivery,  
USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2013, 11:26 pm), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/06/us-postal-service-delivery-
mail-saturdays/1895277/. 
100 See generally HAW. REV STAT. § 481X-4 (West 2000). 
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contracts, warranty contracts or extended warranty 
contracts. For the purposes of this rule these contracts 
shall be hereinafter called Extended Service Contracts. 
Providers of said contracts shall be called Extended 
Service Contract Providers (hereinafter “ESCP”). 
The consumer shall be provided with either the full 
extended service contract as a whole prior to the 
opportunity to purchase same, or in the alternative, a 
brochure which specifically describes the terms, 
conditions, and exclusions of the contract, and the 
provisions of this section relating to contract delivery, 
cancellation, and refund, shall be delivered to the buyer 
at or before the time of purchase of the contract. Both 
of these must be in clear, simple and understandable 
language but in no event shall either be written using 
language written above a high school grade level. The 
use of legalese is specifically prohibited. Failure of the 
ESCP to comport with these terms shall entitle a 
consumer to treble damages as well as attorney’s fees in 
the event of suit brought for violation of these terms. 
Additionally, the Service Contract and brochure that 
accompanies any purchased good shall contain the following: 
(1) A clear description and identification of the product; 
(2) The date when the extended service contract 
commences and its duration; 
(3) A description of the limits on transfer or assignment 
of the extended service contract if the enforceability of 
an extended service contract is limited to the original 
buyer or is limited to persons other than every 
consumer owner of the covered product during the 
term of the extended service contract; 
(4) A statement of the obligation of the extended 
service contract provider including statements of: 
(A) Any services, parts, components, defects, 
malfunctions, conditions, repairs or remedies 
that are excluded from the scope of the 
extended service contract; 
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(B) Any limits on the obligations of the ESCP; 
(C) Any additional services which the ESCP will 
supply; 
(D) Whether the buyer has the responsibility of 
any other obligations and, if so, the nature and 
frequency of such obligations, and the 
consequences of any noncompliance; 
No extended service contract may limit its repair 
service obligation under the contract, by way of 
exclusion or otherwise to a level below that which 
would make the product reasonably operational 
again after failure. 
(5) A step-by-step explanation of the procedure which 
the buyer shall follow in order to obtain performance of 
any obligation under the extended service contract 
including: 
(A)  The full legal and business name of the 
ESCP; 
(B)  The mailing address of the ESCP; 
(C)  The persons or class of persons that are 
authorized to perform service; 
(D)  The name or title and address of any agent, 
employee or department of the ESCP that is 
responsible for the performance of any 
obligations; 
(E)  The method of giving notice to the ESCP 
of the need for service; 
(F)  Whether in-home service is provided or, if 
not, whether the costs of transporting the 
product for service or repairs will be paid by the 
ESCP. All service contracts shall provide for the 
ability to have in home service or repair, or in 
lieu of in home service repair may provide the 
consumer with free shipping to and from the 
repair facility. The cost of this additional 
coverage shall not exceed 10% of the contract’s 
purchase price; 
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(G)  If the product must be transported to the 
ESCP, either the place where the product may 
be delivered for service or repairs or a toll-free 
telephone number which the buyer may call to 
have the item picked up for repair; 
(H)  All other steps which the buyer must take to 
obtain service; and 
(I)  All fees, charges and other costs that the buyer 
must pay to obtain service, beyond those whose 
costs by this rule are to be borne by the ESCP; 
(6) A description of the services the ESCP will supply 
under the service contract, said level of service shall not 
be below that which would normally constitute 
merchantability as this term is defined in the Uniform 
Commercial Code; and 
(7) A statement of a right to cancel the contract within 
thirty days of purchase if the buyer has made no claim 
under the terms of the service contract, or if the buyer 
returns the product or the product is sold, lost, stolen 
or destroyed. 
(8) An extended warranty or service contract shall not 
be issued, sold or offered for sale unless the ESCP is 
insured under an extended warranty reimbursement 
insurance policy issued by an insurer authorized to do 
business in this state, for the approximated costs of 
repair or replacement of all goods covered under 
outstanding service contracts. This insurance policy 
shall cover all outstanding Extended Service Contracts. 
(9) The extended warranty reimbursement insurance 
policy shall cover the obligations under the extended 
warranty sold by the ESCP during the period of time 
that such provider’s insurance policy is in force. Should 
the ESCP’s insurance policy described herein lapse or 
be cancelled all buyers who would normally be covered 
under said policy for service contracts which they have 
purchased must be immediately notified. 
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Nothing contained in this rule shall limit the States the 
ability to regulate insurance policies or express 
warranties. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
What is needed is a uniform Federal statute or Federal Trade 
Commission rule that provides parity between the manufacturers, 
providers, and the consumers.  In days gone by, an aggrieved consumer 
would simply return their defective or problematic product to his local 
retailer to get satisfaction.  The fact today is that most retailers are no 
longer local and the buying behavior of the consumer has now become 
national, if not global.  One can see that the initial concept behind the 
implied warranty of merchantability was the basic understanding that a 
product needed to be fit for its ordinary purpose, and  it needed to do 
what was reasonably expected.  It is counter-intuitive that we should 
require manufacturers to make a product that meets ordinary 
expectations, but then at the same time allow for the states to remove 
that obligation. Further, it does not follow that if we allow a 
manufacturer to make a product below normal expectation that we 
should then also allow them to sell a service contract to the consumer to 
repair the sub-standard product which leaves all bargaining for the 
extended contract in the hands of the manufacturer or retailer. 
Consumers deserve products that meet normal expectations.  If a 
consumer desires to purchase a service contract to extend the potential 
life of his purchase beyond what is reasonable, the consumer should be 
allowed to receive value for his purchase. How does one evaluate that 
value?  First, he should be allowed to inspect the contract he is 
purchasing in its entirety, not merely a synopsis.  Second, the language 
used should be of a type that an average person of high school level 
intelligence can understand.  Third, the terms of the service contract 
should have real value, not perceived value.  It is not a value to pay 
$200.00 for a service contract to repair a flat screen television if one 
must ship the television to the manufacturer for service, where shipping 
is paid for by the consumer.  There is a reason we moved away from 
caveat emptor , let us not lose sight of why that was done. 
